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The Justiciability Myth and
the Concept of Law
By WAYNE MCCORMACK*
Introduction
A myth is an imaginary thing, person, or series of events ostensibly
based on historical fact and used to explain or exemplify a cultural phe-
nomenon.1 Whether believed or not, a myth can have an impact on the
decisional processes of living persons.' What better way to describe the
phenomenon of justiciability, which does not exist but which has a
profound impact on important constitutional decisional processes?
This Article contends that there is no such thing as justiciability,
except for the narrow requirement that courts handle only judicial pro-
ceedings. 3 To say that a "case" before the court' is nonjusticiable is to
say that the plaintiff has no judicially enforceable right. To say that the
plaintiff has no judicial right is to make a conclusive statement about the
nature of the "law" on which the plaintiff is relying; it is necessarily an
exercise in interpretation and application of that law to say that the law
applied by the court does not protect the plaintiff. Masking the holding
* Professor of Law, University of Utah. B.A., Stanford University, 1966; J.D., Univer-
sity of Texas, 1969.
Portions of this Article are based on the corresponding chapter in CONsTrrTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY (3d ed. 1987), which the author had the privilege of co-
authoring with Dean Jerome Barron of George Washington University, Professor Thomas
Dienes of George Washington University, and Professor Martin Redish of Northwestern Uni-
versity. If any of their words have crept into this Article, I apologize and claim inadvertence.
The views expressed here are solely mine and should not be attributed to, nor derogate from,
the other authors or the casebook itself.
1. WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1622 (1946).
2. Examples of myths that have had profound impact in the twentieth century would
include Aryan Supremacy, nuclear deterrence, and human rights. If one says that the Western
world has been dominated for centuries by the myths of the virgin birth and resurrection of
Christ, there is a risk of offending others by seeming to conclude that those events were imagi-
nary rather than real. It does not really matter for that purpose, however, whether the events
were imaginary; the impact of the mythology is the same. With respect to a contemporary
concept such as justiciability, it makes only a slight difference whether the concept is real or
imaginary. The difference is in how one conceptualizes the analysis.
3. See infra note 153.
4. There is no question that the Supreme Court, or any other court with similar discre-
tionary control over its docket, can avoid decision by refusing to accept a case.
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in language that purports to decide only a "preliminary" or "threshold"
issue hides a decision on the merits without elaborating the reasons be-
hind the decision. Justiciability, like any other decision for or against a
claimed "right," is a label that expresses a decision on the conflicting
interests of the parties and the constraints that operate on each.
Many commentators have decried the tendency of the Burger
Court5 to avoid decision or to deny access to the courts,6 while others
have defended and rationalized the use of "decision avoidance" tech-
niques.7 It is not enough to critique the Court on these apparently prac-
tical bases. It is important to go further to show that the Court is
altering the nature of constitutional "law."
8
The point of this Article will be familiar to students of the debate
over the existence or proper use of the "political question" doctrine. For
Professors Wechsler9 and Henkin,' 0 exercise of the "political question"
doctrine is no different from any other constitutional decision, because
the decision to defer to the political branches is itself an interpretation of
the constitutional commands. Professor Bickel, on the other hand, not
only believed that the doctrine exists but that it should be used readily
when the Court faces issues that are too monumental or beyond the
Court's capacity."' Professor Redish agrees that the doctrine exists but
argues that it should not. 2 This Article attempts to show that the
Wechsler-Henkin position results in repudiating the very existence of the
5. On issues of justiciability, the Supreme Court of the last decade could be termed the
Rehnquist Court because it is primarily Justice Rehnquist who has revitalized the doctrine.
Many opinions of the Court authored by other Justices bear the unmistakable stamp of Rehn-
quist leadership on this issue. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (opinion by
Justice O'Connor); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (opinion by Justice Powell); Schles-
inger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (opinion by Chief Justice
Burger).
6. Doemberg, "We the People" John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Stand-
ing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 52 (1985); Nichol, Abusing Standing:
A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1985).
7. Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article II: Perspectives on the "'Case or Controversy"
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979); Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii:
A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1308 (1982).
8. Many of the Rehnquist decisions hold that the "law" is not as the plaintiff wishes it
because any constitutional duties that the defendant might have are not judicially enforceable.
The notion that the Constitution imposes duties that are not enforceable may be in keeping
with some modem strands of legal philosophy. See C. WELLMAN, A THEORY OF RIGHTS 213
(1985). But it markedly changes the Constitution from a positive check on government into a
set of hortatory directives that "We the People" may be quite incapable of enforcing.
9. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7-9
(1959).
10. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 213 (1972).
11. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (2d ed. 1986).
12. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031 (1985).
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doctrine, and suggests that that conclusion extends to the related doc-
trines of standing and ripeness. In the process, this Article will deal with
the various rationales for the existence of the doctrine to show that none
is terribly persuasive.
I. The Appearance of Decision Avoidance
Courts dealing with common law and most statutory issues have
rarely engaged in decision avoidance of the type claimed by courts deal-
ing with constitutional issues. Common-law courts have not been reluc-
tant to deny a litigant relief because he or she has no right which has
been invaded or which the court can enforce against the defendant. For
example, prior to the recognition of valid third-party beneficiary con-
tracts, the beneficiary attempting to enforce a contract would be dis-
missed for lack of an enforceable right against the promisor; the
promisor had no duty to the beneficiary.13 Prior to the recognition of a
duty by accountants to foreseeable third parties when preparing financial
statements, the defrauded investor who relied on a company's financial
statement would lose in a suit against the accountant; the accountant had
no duty to unknown third parties.14 Prior to recognition of the tort of
infliction of emotional distress, a person could not recover for traumatic
injuries unless there was physical contact inflicted by the defendant; the
defendant had no duty to avoid causing emotional harm.15 In each of
these instances, the decision could be phrased as a lack of "standing" on
the part of the plaintiff, but common-law courts have left no doubt about
the nonexistence of a right on the part of the claimant and a lack of duty
on the part of the defendant.
By contrast, the Supreme Court and other federal courts may pur-
port to leave the existence of constitutional "rights" in limbo, at least for
a period of time. The result of a "refusal to decide" is just as effective a
denial of relief to that litigant and those similarly situated as a "decision
on the merits," but the court purports to leave open the possibility that
the claimed "right" exists. The right may exist in someone else or under
different circumstances, or it may exist without being judicially
enforceable.
13. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 17-1 (2d ed. 1977).
14. Compare Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919) (no duty), with State
Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 15 N.E.2d 416 (N.Y. 1938) (duty of accountant to avoid gross
negligence).
15. Compare Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 254 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1953) (the plaintiff
must have been within the zone of contact), with RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment k (1985) (physical proximity not required).
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For example, the federal court may say that a black citizen has no
standing to sue the Internal Revenue Service for failing to enforce non-
discriminatory policies against private schools. 16 Does the citizen never-
theless have a "right" to nondiscriminatory treatment by the school and
does the school have a "duty" to be nondiscriminatory while receiving
tax benefits? The answer is "perhaps"; we do not know whether other
rights and duties exist, but we do know that the citizen does not have a
judicial claim for IRS enforcement of any of the duties owed by the
school.
Some scholars are highly critical of the federal courts' behavior in
this regard. Professor Davis asks the question in this way:
The natural system is that of the common law. If A and B are
private parties and A hurts B, B has standing to get a determina-
tion of the legality of A's action. Why should not the law be the
same, whether A is the government, an agency, an officer, or a
private party, and whether the injury is to B's person, his physical
property, or his intangible interests? Is not the natural system the
simple one that injury in fact is enough for standing? 7
The answer given by the federal courts essentially is that the formi-
dable weapon of judicial review and the delicate role of the courts in a
political system make it necessary for the courts to develop techniques
for avoiding decision on some issues, leaving themselves free to come
back to the issue in another setting at another time. 8 But what happens
to the claimed "rights" during the period of limbo? Do they exist some-
where in ether, or do they enter a chrysalis to emerge later as full-grown
adults?
Declaring an issue to be nonjusticiable leaves three points in the
hands of the political branches. First is the question of whether the Con-
stitution contains any limits on governmental action. Second is the ques-
tion of what those limits should be if they exist at all. Third is whether
the limits are transgressed in a given circumstance. The differences be-
tween this third point and a frank recognition that no limits exist at one
extreme, or a review with deference to the political branches at the other,
is found principally in the "debate value" of the constitutional provision.
United States v. Richardson,19 the "CIA funding" case, provides a good
example. When the Court held that the requirement of a public account-
ing of funds was nonjusticiable, the debate on CIA funding in Congress
16. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). See also infra notes 36-40 & 158-161 and ac-
companying text.
17. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. Rav. 450, 468 (1970).
18. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 146.
19. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
became entirely political. Although it is possible for a member of Con-
gress to argue that a particular secret use of funds is unconstitutional,
nobody is likely to take the argument very seriously if the Court has
already declared the provision to be nonenforceable. If, on the other
hand, the Court had said that there must be an accounting of the total
federal budget, with public disclosure of each expenditure required only
when the expenditure was "significant" in terms of size or purpose, the
debate could have centered on whether this specific use of funds was one
that should be disclosed.
Thayer believed that the "debate value" of the Constitution was di-
minished by the exercise of judicial review and that legislators tended to
become lazy and defer constitutional decisions to courts."0 That is un-
doubtedly true, but the problem can hardly be turned into an attack on
the foundations of judicial review itself. Unless we are willing to do away
with judicial review entirely, the debate value of any particular provision
turns on whether the provision is deemed to be a part of the higher law of
the Constitution. Once having assumed the Marbury burden of following
the law, for the Supreme Court then to leave both interpretation and
enforcement to the political branches is to attempt to read the provision
out of the governing law and make it a mere exhortation.
If the Rehnquist Court wishes to make the political branches more
involved in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, then it should
disclaim the role of ultimate arbiter which the Court has held for almost
200 years. Without that step, the declaration of "nonjusticiability" of a
constitutional provision places the provision in the category of "nonlaw."
A. The Standing Decisions Which Decide the Merits
L The Citizen-Taxpayer Cases
The cases that best exemplify the attempt to avoid a question while
deciding it are the citizen-taxpayer cases. In Frothingham v. Mellon,21
the Court held that a taxpayer lacked standing to challenge a spending
measure by Congress because the only restraint she alleged was one
shared generally by all taxpayers. In Flast v. Cohen,22 the Court held
that a taxpayer had standing to challenge a spending measure when there
was a restraint, such as the first amendment prohibition on establishment
of religion, that was violated by the measure.23 Then, in Valley Forge
20. J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-07 (1901).
21. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
22. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
23. The precise way that the Court reached this sophistic conclusion was through the so-
called dual nexus test. The taxpayer was required to establish a nexus between his status as a
taxpayer and the measure challenged, which is inevitable with a spending measure. Secondly,
Sorine 19871 THE JUSTICIABILITY M=T
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Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc.,24 the Court held that a taxpayer did not have standing to
challenge an executive decision to give away property rather than money
for religious purposes. The Court noted two distinctions between the
cases.
First, the Court said that the transfer was accomplished under the
Property Clause rather than the Spending Clause and that Flast held the
Establishment Clause to be a limitation only on Congress' spending
power.25 The opinion does not say what difference it makes that the
school received land and buildings worth $577,500 rather than receiving
$577,500 in cash to purchase land and buildings. It is hard to believe
that the taxpayer-citizen has less interest in land than in cash. To distin-
guish Flast on this basis, the Court must hold that the Constitution pro-
hibits transfers of cash without prohibiting transfers of land. Valley
Forge thus stands as a pristine example of the Court's masking a holding
on the merits behind the language of standing.26
Second, the Valley Forge Court stated that the transfer of property
was accomplished without implicating the validity of a congressional en-
actment.27 It is hard to believe that Flast would have been decided differ-
ently if the statute left the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare free to decide which schools received subsidies and the adminis-
trator had decided to give money to a religious school.2' A statute dic-
tating that money or land is to be given to religious schools leaves less
doubt about the overall impact of a subsidy program than does a statute
giving discretion to the executive branch, but the amount of money and
the taxpayer status had to be linked to a constitutional prohibition. In Flast, the second link
was found in the Establishment Clause's specific purpose of protecting taxpayers from having
their money spent for religious purposes. Two points deserve emphasis. First, if there is a
nexus between the taxpayer and the other two elements, then logically there must be a link
between those two elements themselves. Second, the link between those two elements is only
established if the constitutional provision itself protects against the measure under challenge.
In other words, the taxpayer has standing if she is correct on the merits of the legal challenge.
24. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
25. Id. at 479-80.
26. Perhaps we should not be too critical of this Court because the problem was actually
created when Flast did precisely the same thing in response to the earlier example in Frothing-
ham. The latter case was just as much a holding on the lack of limits on Congress' spending
power as one could ask. The Flast opinion then went to substantial lengths to explain that the
taxpayer had standing because the taxpayer was right on the merits. 392 U.S. at 103-06. By
contrast, Valley Forge does not explain why the Establishment Clause does not operate on the
Property Clause. Flast and Valley Forge thus make it easier to see that Frothingham initially
was a decision on the merits.
27. 454 U.S. at 480.
28. That, of course, is exactly what happened in Flast. The purported distinction is not
even accurate on the facts.
600
THE JUSTICLABILITY MYTH
the impact on religious values may be just as great under either. In any
event, these arguments do not avoid the merits of the case; they are the
merits.
The Court has frequently disparaged citizen-litigants who present
no "particularized" claim of injury not shared with the citizenry at
large.29 With regard to the Valley Forge plaintiffs, the Court said:
"Although [they] claim that the Constitution has been violated, they
claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by
them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the
psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of con-
duct with which one disagrees."30 The Court essentially held that there
had been no "legal injury" because the Establishment Clause did not cre-
ate a private right of action to sue the government official who violated
it-thus imposing the same hurdle that had already been crossed in Flast.
On this point, Valley Forge stands in flat contradiction to Flast on an
important underlying constitutional issue.
The Court's handling of the "Public Accounting" and "Dual Office"
Clauses provides two more examples of this phenomenon. In Schlesinger
v. Reservists' Committee To Stop the War,3 the Court held that a citizen
did not have standing to enforce the constitutional proscription against
members of Congress also serving in the armed forces. In United States
v. Richardson,32 the Court held that a taxpayer-citizen did not have
standing to enforce the clause requiring a public accounting of all federal
expenditures as against a CIA claim of confidentiality in its budget. In
both of these cases, the Court pretended to leave open the possibility that
the constitutional provision was being violated and that the citizen had a
form of "right" to better treatment. But in both cases the Court held
that there was no showing of harm to the complainant. The Court has
held all that it can hold when it says that there is no judicially enforcea-
ble right against the government conduct. Whether the rights are en-
forceable in some other forum is not particularly helpful on this question,
at least not when the other forum is provided by the party alleged to have
violated those claimed rights.
The Public Accounting and Dual Office Clauses will not be enforced
if a majority does not want them enforced. The Supreme Court has said
that the minority cannot insist on their enforcement because there is no
harm to the minority that is not also suffered by the majority. This asser-
29. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
30. 454 U.S. at 485 (emphasis in original).
31. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
32. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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tion is simply wrong. The harm suffered by the minority in having a
constitutional value ignored is shared by the majority, but the majority
has declared that it does not feel aggrieved. That declaration does not
change the harm but shows that it will not be redressed unless by the
courts. If we accept the textual and structural bases of judicial review,
then we must assume that the Constitution itself defines the harm or else
the provision would not have been written down.33 Moreover, in these
two instances the constitutional value is one of the structure of govern-
ment itself, perhaps the most important of constitutional principles.
2 Causation as an Issue Decided on the Pleadings
Several recent decisions predicate lack of standing on the lack of a
direct causal link from a defendant's conduct to a plaintiff's claimed
harm. In most of those decisions, the Court is implying that the plaintiff
is suing the wrong person, which is nothing more than a statement that
the defendant owes no duty. In others, the causal link might be estab-
lished after trial, but the case never gets that far.
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,34 the
Court dismissed, on the basis of standing, a claim that the IRS should
enforce a stringent definition of "charitable" in exempting hospitals from
federal tax laws. The Court held that the plaintiffs could not show that
the hospitals would render free health care if threatened with loss of their
tax exemption, nor that IRS inaction had resulted in a lessening of chari-
table health care in the plaintiffs' community." In Allen v. Wright,36 the
Court held that plaintiff citizens and parents of black school children had
no standing to force the IRS to enforce nondiscrimination rules against
tax exempt private schools. The dismissal was based at least in part on
the belief that tax exempt status was not causing the discriminatory prac-
tices of private schools. 37 In Simon and Allen, it was barely possible that
the plaintiffs' requested relief would not have brought complete satisfac-
tion because the third parties-schools and hospitals-still could have
behaved as they did before the lawsuit even without their tax exemption.
The Court seized on this possibility to claim that the plaintiffs had not
shown it was the government who had caused their harm, if any.
33. Professor Doernberg argues that many constitutional provisions were specifically
designed to create "collective interests" that the Court is refusing to recognize. "The effect is
that certain constitutional provisions effectively exist only at the whim and during the good
will of the government, because the collective interest in enforcement of such provisions will
not be protected by the courts." Doernberg, supra note 6, at 56.
34. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
35. Id. at 42-44.
36. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
37. Id. at 757-59.
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One puzzling element is what exact procedural device the govern-
ment could use for raising this type of "no causation" issue.38 None of
the normal procedural devices short of summary judgment is useful for
asserting that the plaintiff may not be completely satisfied by the relief
available or for raising factual issues of causation.39 If the court decides,
on summary judgment or after trial, that the plaintiff has shown no
harm, then the decision against the plaintiff is not a refusal to decide the
merits but is a final decision on the merits:
The crucial question on the merits of the Allen claim was
whether the government created a subsidy that in fact encouraged
white students to leave the public schools. Under the majority's
application of the traceability requirement, the connection between
government action and the enrollment of white students in dis-
criminatory private schools must be alleged in such a specific man-
ner that there could be no speculation as to its truth. As a result,
the plaintiffs were required to prove their case in the complaint
without benefit of discovery or trial.'
Justice Brennan's dissent in Allen accuses the majority of "improp-
erly requiring [the plaintiffs] to prove their case on the merits in order to
defeat a motion to dismiss."'" Justice Brennan was the author of another
stinging dissent in Warth v. Seldin,42 in which the Supreme Court dis-
missed on standing grounds a complaint by every conceivable complain-
ant against the allegedly racially exclusive zoning practices of a suburban
community. With respect to taxpayers in the nearby city who alleged
that their taxes were higher as a result of having to provide all the low-
income housing in the vicinity, the majority decided that their taxes were
not set by the suburb but by the city and therefore the suburb had caused
them no harm.43 With regard to low-income plaintiffs who wanted to
live in the suburb, the majority held that there was no showing that they
could afford low-income housing there if it were built. 4 And with re-
38. In Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), the Court empha-
sized that the plaintiffs were entitled to a trial on the issue of whether they had been harmed by
the realtors' steering practices.
39. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to dismiss
a case on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
Rule 12(b)(3) deals with dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 19 states the
tests for whether a case can go forward in the absence of concerned parties.
40. Nichol, supra note 6, at 640 n.27.
41. 468 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. 422 U.S. 490, 519 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 508-10. Builders who claimed to have been deterred by the town practices from
preparing applications for zoning or building permits for low-cost housing were said by the
Court not to have shown a harm because they had not persevered to the end of the process.
Id. at 516. In other words, their claims were not ripe because they lacked temerity.
44. Id. at 504-07.
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gard to residents of the suburb, the majority held that they were not
harmed despite their assertion of harm from living in a segregated
environment.45
Justice Brennan pointed out that the factual allegations of the com-
plaint must be taken as true on the motion to dismiss and that therefore
the majority must mean that the alleged harms were not "legal" harms
or harms to a "judicially cognizable" interest.46 This is nothing other
than a decision that the suburb had not violated any constitutional rights
of the plaintiffs. It may be that this is a perfectly defensible result, but
the language of standing provides no analysis by which to measure the
denial of constitutional protection.
The causation requirements of the Court go well beyond the ques-
tion of when causation must be shown. During a half-century of writing
about tort law, Dean Leon Green tried to show that courts were on the
wrong track when they confused issues of causation with issues of
whether a defendant should be liable for the plaintiff's harm.4 7 Dean
Green sympathetically but roundly criticized courts for masking hold-
ings on whether a defendant ought to be liable in the language of causa-
tion, saying that "we run ahead in our mind to grapple in terms of cause
with the ultimate problems of responsibility though causal relation is ob-
vious."' 48 The result of that tendency, for Dean Green, was to mask
holdings on policy as if they were mere holdings on fact.4 9
Why has the Burger Court fallen into the trap from which Dean
Green tried to extricate courts in tort cases? A cynical view would be
that the Court is masking its policy holdings deliberately to avoid criti-
cism on policy grounds.50 An explanation more in keeping with Dean
45. Id. at 512-14.
46. Id. at 519-23 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
47. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L. Rlv. 543, 549
(1962) ("Conduct is a factual concept; the victim's hurt is a factual concept; causal relation is a
factual concept. Duty, negligence, and damages are legal concepts and depend upon different
considerations from those involved in the determination of causal relation.").
48. Id. at 545-46.
49. In numerous meritorious cases the judgment of a trial court based on the verdict
of a jury is upset, or liability is denied altogether. In other cases causation doctrines
are drawn in when they are not needed, and the cases could be disposed of briefly in
terms of duties and risks, understandable and acceptable to everyone. In still other
cases the courts have reached a rational judgment on the basis of duties and risks,
only to turn back in quest ofjudgments based on "cause" and sometimes nullify their
own good work.
Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L, REv. 42, 62 (1962).
50. It may well be that the Supreme Court has no desire to make sense of the stand-
ing doctrine. As the doctrine presently exists, standing can apparently be either
rolled out or ignored in order to serve unstated and unexamined values....
The Burger Court has raised the toughest standing hurdles in cases in which
minorities have challenged exclusionary zoning practices, patterns of police brutality,
W~ol. 14:595
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Green's sympathetic view of the matter is that the Court has found some
of these challenges to be difficult on policy grounds and yet does not
want to say that citizens are not entitled to some degree of expectations
from their government in that area. Therefore, rather than deny any role
for constitutional restraints, the Court limits the scope of those restraints
by finding that the plaintiff cannot assert a harm that is covered by the
restraint in question.
In Simon, Allen, and Warth, the Court could have forthrightly con-
cluded that the plaintiffs were wrong in asserting that government con-
duct had violated their constitutional rights. Rather than insult the
citizen, the Court held that the plaintiff had suffered no harm at the
hands of government and that there were others more directly responsi-
ble. The problem with this approach is that it does not explain why the
constitutional provision does not protect the plaintiff against the harm
which has been alleged. The Court holds the constitutional provision
does not cover this harm with no explanation in constitutional terms.
3. Enforcing the Government's Obligation to Enforce the Law
As mentioned above, some of the "causation" cases are actually at-
tempts to compel the exercise of the government's law enforcement au-
thority. In a few instances, the Court has dealt directly with whether a
duty of enforcement is owed, but has still cast the holdings in standing
language.
In Linda RS. v. Richard D.,51 an unwed mother brought suit seek-
ing an injunction to require state officials to enforce a child support law
against the father of her child. The Court said that "appellant has made
no showing that her failure to secure support payments results from the
nonenforcement, as to her child's father," 2 of the child support law.
The Court also stated that "in American jurisprudence at least, a private
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-
and judicial or administrative bias. Poverty plaintiffs have been barred from chal-
lenging the discriminatory enforcement of child support obligations, and the tax-
exempt status of hospitals that deny them emergency medical services. Litigants
seeking to prevent government from contributing valuable property to religious orga-
nizations and to force public disclosure of the CIA budget have similarly fallen
before an aggressive standing doctrine.
On the other hand, standing requirements have been eased in cases sustaining
the constitutionality of the federal subsidy for the nuclear power plant industry, up-
holding Secretary (of the Interior James] Watt's offshore leasing policy, affirming the
propriety of tuition tax credits to private schools, and condoning government support
for chaplains and Christmas creches. One could perhaps be forgiven for confusing
standing's agenda with that of the New Right.
Nichol, supra note 6, at 658-59.
51. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
52. Id. at 618.
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prosecution of another." 3
Is this case based on a lack of causation or a lack of a right? Obvi-
ously, the government officials did not cause the father to refuse to pay
child support, but on the other hand their prosecution of him might
cause him to make the payments. Therefore, the question to be decided
was whether the officials owed a duty to the mother to prosecute the
father. The Court resolved this issue by dismissing for lack of standing,
but provided no explanation for why there was no constitutional duty to
enforce the law.
In Adams v. Richardson,54 the plaintiffs were black students, citi-
zens, and taxpayers. They alleged that officials of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare had been "derelict in their duty to en-
force Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because they ha[d] not
taken appropriate action to end segregation in public educational institu-
tions receiving federal funds."" The government claimed that judicial
review was unavailable because the question of enforcement was "com-
mitted to agency discretion," and relied on "cases in which courts have
declined to disturb the exercise of prosecutorial discretion."56 The court
of appeals held that funding is a different matter and that a general policy
of nonenforcement is reviewable.5 7
Most state courts take the view that prosecutorial discretion is unre-
viewable." The reasons are hinted at in the Adams opinion. Prosecutors
do not have sufficient personnel or funds to prosecute every case and
therefore must make some selective choices for which there usually are
no standards to judge whether the discretion was properly exercised in a
given case. The result is to say that the citizen has no litigable interest in
53. Id. at 619.
54. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
55. Id. at 1161 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 1161-62.
57. [T]his suit is not brought to challenge HEW's decision with regard to a few
school districts in the course of a generally effective enforcement program. To the
contrary, appellants allege that HEW has consciously and expressly adopted a gen-
eral policy which is in effect an abdication of its statutory duty....
... HEW is actively supplying segregated institutions with federal funds, con-
trary to the expressed purposes of Congress. It is one thing to say the Justice Depart-
ment lacks the resources necessary to locate and prosecute every civil rights violator;
it is quite another to say HEW may affirmatively continue to channel federal funds to
defaulting schools.
Id. at 1162.
58. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Tavern Ass'n v. General Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 472 Pa. 567,
372 A.2d 1187, 1192 (1977) (Roberts, J., concurring). It has been suggested that a court could
impose some parameters for an agency's prosecutorial discretion when due process concerns
are raised or when the agency's decision violates the state Administrative Procedure Act. Surf
Attractions, Inc. v. Department of Business Reg., 480 So. 2d 1354, 1356 (Fla. App. 1985).
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whether a given case should be prosecuted, much like the second ration-
ale in Linda R.S.59
After Linda R.S., Adams might not be decided the same way today,
although the funding rationale might still be maintained. The reasons
would be much more understandable and palatable if openly and hon-
estly stated in terms of the lack of an enforceable duty to citizens on the
part of government law enforcement agencies.
The citizen's law enforcement issue arose in an unusual way in Dia-
mond v. Charles.6° Dr. Diamond intervened at the district court level in
a suit brought by other physicians against a new Illinois statute regulat-
ing abortions. When the statute was declared unconstitutional in part,
the State appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which
affirmed. Dr. Diamond then appealed to the Supreme Court, but the
State did not. The Court, citing Linda R.S., held that Dr. Diamond had
no standing to pursue the appeal.61 The Court also dismissed as too
speculative Dr. Diamond's claims that if the abortion law were upheld,
there would be more babies born and thus his practice as a pediatrician
would improve.62 Diamond is a wholly unexceptional example of the
lack of a duty to prosecute. Why it should use special language such as
standing is a mystery.
4. Third-Party Standing
The Warth v. Seldin63 opinion provides a concrete example of the
anomaly called "third-party" assertion of rights. The Court says that
"[iln essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.""
For this purpose, with respect to the low-income and minority plaintiffs,
the court will "assume... that such intentional exclusionary practices, if
proved in a proper case, would be adjudged violative of the constitutional
and statutory rights of the persons excluded." 65 Then, with respect to
the white taxpayers of Rochester and the white residents of Penfield, the
Court finds that those plaintiffs "do not, even if they could, assert any
personal right under the Constitution or any statute."66 This is an adju-
dication on the merits of their claim to personal rights. Without saying
59. If a state prosecutor refuses to enforce a provision of state law, she might be subject to
quo warranto action challenging her fitness to hold office.
60. 106 S. Ct. 1697 (1986).
61. Id. at 1704.
62. Id. at 1705.
63. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
64. Id. at 498.
65. Id. at 502.
66. Id. at 509.
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why, the Court has held that these people have no right to have Penfield
integrated.
The contraception cases present another example. In Tileston v. UII-
man,67 the Court held that a doctor had no standing to challenge Con-
necticut's prohibition on birth control. Twenty-two years later, in
Griswold v. Connecticut,68 a doctor and the nonphysician director of a
birth control clinic were convicted of aiding and abetting married per-
sons in violating the criminal provisions of the Connecticut birth control
statute. The Court held that these defendants had standing to raise the
rights of privacy of their patients and reversed the convictions.6 9 The
Court emphasized that the defendants had a "professional relationship"
with the persons whose rights were at stake. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,7" a
pharmacist was allowed to raise the rights of unmarried persons to re-
ceive contraceptives. After Griswold and Eisenstadt, it must be true that
a health care provider has a right to distribute contraceptives. It makes
no sense that the provider must rely on the rights of the recipients to
successfully establish standing.
In Barrows v. Jackson,71 the Supreme Court allowed white property
owners to resist state judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive cove-
nant on the sale of property. The owners had entered into a contract to
sell their property to a black family in violation of a mutual restrictive
covenant which bound all the owners within a certain neighborhood.
When neighbors sued for damages, the sellers resisted on the ground that
state enforcement of the covenant would constitute a violation of the
equal protection rights of the black purchasers. The Court assumed that
the sellers had no equal protection rights at stake, but focused on the
practical inability of the black purchasers to assert their own rights and
granted the sellers standing to assert those rights.
The seller in Barrows or the doctor in Griswold could be compared
to the beneficiary of an insurance policy. The process of denying or con-
ferring rights in the constitutional cases does not differ in any significant
degree from a court's deciding whether the third-party beneficiary has a
"right" to enforce a contract. Courts at common law have not worried
about letting the beneficiary enforce rights of the original party to the
contract but instead have focused directly on whether the beneficiary
should be able to obtain relief. 2 Once the sellers or the doctors are al-
67. 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. Id. at 481.
70. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
71. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
72. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 13, at 605.
lowed to obtain judicial relief, it makes no sense to say that they are
asserting someone else's rights.
There are, of course, cases in which a person attempts to represent
another without authority to do so. For example, the Supreme Court
decided in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District 73 that an individ-
ual member of the school board lacked standing to make an appeal from
a district court decision regarding the school organization's wish to con-
duct prayer sessions on school property. The Court held that one mem-
ber of a "collegial body" cannot act for the body itself.74 These are not
cases in which a person is attempting to rely on another's rights to his
own benefit, but instead, they are examples of attempts to bind another
person to a position that the other does not assert. In these instances, the
courts are perfectly correct in insisting upon the requisite degree of
authority.
Professor Sedler once advocated the creation of a body of rules that
would recognize standing in "third-party" cases and labelled it '1 us ter-
tii.'" 75 He has reexamined his position in light of more recent cases and
has come to the following conclusion:
I now believe that as a general proposition, a party should be
able to prevail in constitutional litigation only if he can show some
violation of his own rights.... [I]n the cases in which the assertion
of constitutional jus tertii was permitted, the application of the
challenged law or government action to the party asserting jus ter-
tii was itself unconstitutional or otherwise invalid. Conversely, in
the cases in which the assertion of jus tertii was not permitted, any
possible violation of third party rights was irrelevant to a determi-
nation of the constitutionality of the law as applied to the
litigant.76
Professor Sedler argues that the real question in any case is whether
the law being challenged violates substantive constitutional protections
to be afforded the party before the court. That position is precisely the
same as the one advocated in this Article. Sedler might be more restric-
tive in the number of instances in which a law would be found unconsti-
tutional as applied to the litigant before the court, but at least he would
not phrase the dismissal in terms that obscure the factors being used for
decision: either the statute violates the plaintiff's constitutional rights or
it does not.
73. 106 S. Ct. 1326 (1986).
74. Id. at 1333.
75. Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE
LJ. 599 (1962).
76. Sedler, supra note 7, at 1309.
Srvrina 19871 THE JUSTICIABI1LITY MYTH
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 14:595
Some rules of law, such as the trademark rules,77 explicitly base
legal rights on the effects of the defendant's conduct on absent parties.78
If one person is sued by another for using a name similar to the
tradename of the plaintiff, the central question is whether consumers will
be confused about which product they are patronizing.79 The rule of law
itself makes injury to third persons the touchstone for defining the rights
of the plaintiff. There may well be constitutional provisions that carry
this type of protection for the interests of third persons, but under the
standing rubric one would never find out because the court would refuse
to listen to the arguments of the parties. When the court refuses to listen,
it is deciding that the constitutional rule does not carry the protection
claimed for it.
5. Summary-Standing as a Decision-Avoidance Technique
Oddly enough, it may be surprising to realize that even Professor
Bickel doubted that the standing rubric could be used in many cases to
avoid decision. In discussing the Tennessee Valley Authority cases, he
provided the following analysis."0 In the case in which an existing com-
pany was said to have no standing to challenge the existence of the TVA,
the Court decided the ultimate constitutional issue by holding that one
has no right to be free of competition from a federally chartered entity.81
In the case of the shareholders' suit against their own company which
was selling out to the TVA, Bickel argued that the Court should have
dismissed their claim for lack of standing because the shareholders had
no right from the "general law" to block the sale of their company, re-
gardless of the legality of the TVA. 2 Of course, the latter example would
be as much a decision on the merits as the former, but it would be a
decision on state law grounds rather than on the constitutional issues.
77. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1117 (1982).
78. Every first-year law student is taught to argue the "public interest" in the most rou-
tine legal arguments. These arguments are nothing but an appeal to how a decision in the case
of A v. B will affect the interests of persons not before the court. For example, in a products
liability case, the impact on consumers of having to pay more for the product will be balanced
against the desirability of spreading the risk of loss. The plaintiff essentially is arguing the
interests of other injured persons and the defendant is arguing the interests of consumers, but
both are arguing about their own legal rights.
79. Waterman Co. v. Modem Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88 (1914); John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen
L. Stetson Co., 85 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1936).
80. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 119-20.
81. Id. at 120 (discussing Tennesse Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939)):
[T]he Court was either deciding, on the merits but without opinion, that the Consti-
tution does not protect against competition by such a governmental unit as the TVA,
or that the case was for some discretionary reason an unsuitable one in which to pass
on the constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
82. Id. at 119-21 (discussing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)).
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Similarly, in discussing whether a film distributor could claim a first
amendment right to be free of a licensing scheme without first submitting
his film and being denied a permit, Bickel asserted that the plaintiff cer-
tainly had standing to adjudicate the question of whether the licensing
scheme was void on its face in advance of enforcement.83 For Bickel,
however, the case for decision-avoidance often could be made on the ba-
sis of the ripeness doctrine when standing was unavailable.
B. Ripeness
Ripeness refers to whether there is a current controversy. Unfortu-
nately, however, the Court has used it in a way that decides issues while
pretending to wait for a more concrete case. In United Public Workers v.
Mitchell,84 challenge was made to the Hatch Act's prohibition on polit-
ical activities by public employees." Only one plaintiff had not yet been
threatened with enforcement. The Court held that the "threat of inter-
ference by the Commission with rights of these appellants... implied by
the existence of the law and the regulations" was not a current constitu-
tional violation. 6 There is no point to using language of ripeness when
at least that issue has been decided. The Court in Socialist Labor Party v.
Gilligan87 decided that the Party was not unconstitutionally injured by
being forced to file an affidavit and oath before it could have access to the
ballot. Did the Court gain ground by pretending not to decide the "sub-
stantive merits" of the dispute?
Gilligan may be close in spirit to Poe v. Ullman, 8 in which the
Court held that the Connecticut birth control statute presented no ripe
controversy because it had not been enforced in decades. It has been
argued that Poe, along with Tileston v. Ullman,89 forced the political pro-
cess of Connecticut to come to terms with its own "responsibility for
decision, '"" and also that it allowed the Court to reflect on the mood of
83. Id. at 135 (discussing Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961)):
There is and there ought to be no rule of constitutional standing that, in order to
construct a justiciable case, a plaintiff must submit to the very burden whose validity
he wishes to contest. It is necessary to comply with the other conditions of a licens-
ing process before one can object to denial of a license on this or that specific ground,
because there is no injury before the denial. But no like necessity arises before one
can object to licensing altogether, for then the very requirement constitutes the injury
alleged to be illegal.
84. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
85. 7 U.S.C. §§ 361a-390k (1940).
86. 330 U.S. at 91.
87. 406 U.S. 583 (1972).
88. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
89. 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
90. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 147.
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the country for several years before reaching the constitutional privacy
issue. The result, supposedly, is that the Court was in a stronger position
with the public when it decided Griswold. But what of the "rights" of the
people in Connecticut who misguidedly followed the law for those many
years, some of whom may have ended up with unwanted children with
all the attendant social ills that accompany that phenomenon?91
Mitchell, Gilligan, and Poe each teach that a person who wants to
challenge a criminal statute alleged to be restricting his or her first
amendment freedoms must first violate the statute and be prosecuted
before the Court will listen to the complaint. The social utility of forcing
people to violate an existing law is certainly open to question, particu-
larly when their first amendment interests in speech and privacy are at
stake. 9
2
The Supreme Court has recognized at least one rather interesting
exception to the doctrine. In Ex parte Young,93 the shareholders of a
railroad company sought to enjoin the State Attorney General from en-
forcing a rate regulation scheme. Violation of the regulations would
have occasioned a heavy fine. The Court held that the railroad need not
violate the statute and face the risk of having to pay the fine if its consti-
tutional attack failed; the risk was deemed to be excessive in light of the
benefits to be gained from violation. In dozens, if not hundreds, of cases
businesses have been able to challenge state and local government regula-
tion or licensing schemes without having to violate the provisions of the
law prior to the challenge.94 Is it fair to say that the Court values corpo-
rate dollars more than individual interests in free speech and privacy, or
is there some other explanation?
In Steffel v. Thompson,9" the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment
that a state trespass law could not be applied to his distribution of leaflets
91. The answer given by Professor Bickel was that "[o]ne day the people of Connecticut
may enjoy freedom from birth-control regulation without being guaranteed it by the judges,
and it is much better that way, if possible, even at some intermediate cost to Dr. Buxton [one
of the plaintiffs in Poe]." Id. at 156.
This is an extremely cold-hearted view even as far as it goes. It focuses exclusively on the
practice of a doctor and totally ignores the human costs and potential tragedies of teen-age
pregnancy, for example. Moreover, it assumes the very question of whether the Court could
and did actually avoid decision in Poe. The truth of the matter is that the Court decided Dr.
Buxton had no present constitutionally guaranteed right to dispense contraceptives to his
patients.
92. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
93. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
94. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
95. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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at a private shopping center. He and a companion had gone to the shop-
ping center to hand out leaflets protesting the Vietnam War. The police
were called by the shopping center management and threatened to arrest
the leafletters if they did not leave. Steffel left but his companion defied
the order and continued handing out leaflets. The companion was ar-
rested, prosecuted, and convicted of criminal trespass. Steffel then
sought federal court relief. The Supreme Court held that the specific
threat in light of specific conduct was sufficient to provide a live contro-
versy for a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to that conduct.96
Steffel shows rather clearly that the ripeness issue is merely whether
a remedy can be framed in a given case. The problem is determining
what is protected by the judgment in Steffel. What if Steffel goes back to
the shopping center at a more crowded time of day? With leaflets on a
different subject? With several rough-looking companions? The diffi-
culty with deciding a case in advance of enforcement, unless the decision
is addressed to the validity of the statute on its face, lies in whether a
decree can be formulated with sufficient specificity to give both sides no-
tice of what is allowed and what is prohibited. Whenever a statute is
challenged as applied, in advance of enforcement, the plaintiff must be
able to show that a decree can be framed to take into account the rele-
vant facts without becoming too vague for later enforcement of the de-
cree itself.9
7
Mitchell presented both variations on the theme. The plaintiff in-
tended to challenge the Hatch Act on its face, claiming that the statute,
by its mere existence, interfered with first amendment rights. The Court
rejected this challenge and then looked to whether the statute might be
unconstitutional as applied. Here the information in advance of enforce-
ment left the situation open to too much speculation for the confident
drafting of a decree.98
Thus, all the cases except Poe, Gilligan, and the facial challenge in
Mitchell can be explained as mere problems in drafting remedies. Gilli-
gan and the facial challenge in Mitchell were improperly dismissed with-
out a full explanation of why the statutes were not unconstitutional
restraints on the current first amendment interests of the plaintiffs. In
Mitchell the Court actually gave a reasonable explanation that some
96. Id. at 458-60. A similar result was reached in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965), in which the Court decided that threatened enforcement of a state antisubversive stat-
ute had a "chilling effect" on rights of free expression.
97. Dombrowski and Young presented no similar problem because the statutes were chal-
lenged on their faces rather than as applied.
98. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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types of political campaigning by public employees are not protected by
the First Amendment. In this regard, Mitchell required no special "ripe-
ness" language; it was enough to explain why the plaintiff lost. The Gilli-
gan opinion lacks any explanation of this type.
The Poe dilemma is that of a Court presented with an issue that may
never come to fruition in an enforcement action. The Court therefore
wonders why it should be bothered. The reason is that one might actu-
ally have respect for the "law" that transcends his or her moral scruples.
For the person who wants to obey the law, disobedience to the only ex-
tant legal provision-the state statute-is unacceptable until the Court
says that the law is otherwise. Thus, the result in Poe is actually to de-
cide that the law is what the statute says. Griswold was not truly a return
to an issue that had been ducked years before but an overruling of prior
case law, declaring the law to be different from what it had been after
Poe.
C. Political Questions
The most purposeful of the nonjusticiabiity doctrines is the political
question doctrine, which claims that an issue is for one of the political
branches to decide. It is so avowedly a refusal to decide what law applies
that at least one scholar has advocated that some of the standing cases
should actually be decided under the political question rubric.99 In real-
ity, however, the doctrine is more easily demonstrated to be nonexistent
than any other nonjusticiability doctrine. There is no more clear applica-
tion of law by the Court than to decide that what the political branches
have done is within the scope of their discretion. On those few occasions
when a court has dismissed a suit under the political question doctrine,
the result is an unmistakable decision on the merits of the controversy.
It is surprising that, with all the attention that has been focused over the
years on this doctrine,"° the Supreme Court has almost never used it.
One explanation is that the Court has readily available tools for avoiding
the need even to approach these kinds of cases through denial of certio-
rari or summary affirmance of appeals.
The only Supreme Court cases explicitly analyzing or applying the
political question doctrine are Luther v. Borden,101 Coleman v. Miller,10 2
99. Doernberg, supra note 6, at 68.
100. See A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 183-97; L. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 210-16; Red-
ish, supra note 12, at 599-600; Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Func-
tional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966); Wechsler, supra note 9, at 5.
101. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
102. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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Colegrove v. Green,1"3 Baker v. Carr,"0 Powell v. McCormack,115 and
Goldwater v. Carter."0 6 Baker and Powell rejected application of the doc-
trine; in Colegrove and Carter, the political question rationale com-
manded only a plurality of the Court. The original political question
cases, Luther v. Borden and Coleman v. Miller, thus stand as the only
clear applications of the doctrine. The most thorough analysis is found
in Baker v. Carr, and this analysis merits consideration. It will then be
helpful to look at the effect of some lower court cases that applied the
doctrine to issues arising out of the Vietnam War.
L Luther v. Borden and Coleman v. Miller
Luther presented the Court with a dispute over which of two rival
factions was the lawful government of Rhode Island. The old "charter"
government derived its authority from the pre-Revolution colonial char-
ter and was elected by votes of freeholders pursuant to the charter. The
"convention" government purported to derive authority from a new
constitution drawn up at a self-appointed convention and ratified by
votes in the various counties. The vote under the new constitution was
extended to all persons. Luther was a leader of the new government
whose house was invaded by the old government. His trespass action
was dismissed on the theory that the old government was the lawful gov-
ernment and could exercise its police power against a rebellion.
The Supreme Court's affirmance in Luther was premised on two
grounds. First, the state courts had recognized the old government as
the lawful one; in fact, the new government had never been able to func-
tion as a government.10 7 Second, it was the duty of Congress and the
103. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
104. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
105. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
106. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
107. Although the Court relied on the holding by the state courts regarding the composi-
tion of the state's own government, it pointed out reasons that could have justified ignoring
that holding altogether.
Indeed, we do not see how the question could be tried and judicially decided in a
State court. Judicial power presupposes an established government capable of enact-
ing laws and enforcing their execution, and of appointing judges to expound and
administer them. The acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the authority
of the government from which it is derived. And if the authority of that government
is annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts and other officers is annulled
with it. And if a State court should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and
should come to the conclusion that the government under which it acted had been
put aside and displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and
be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try.
If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the
government under which it is exercising judicial power.
48 U.S. (7 How.) at 39-40.
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President to determine what was a republican form of government. The
route to the latter conclusion was indirect and questionable at best. The
Court stated that "when the senators and representatives of a State are
admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government
under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is
recognized by the proper constitutional authority." ' 8 The clause of the
Constitution promising presidential intervention to quell uprisings within
a state made it the President's duty to determine which of the two com-
peting factions represented the lawful government of any state at any
given time.
The problem with Luther is that the Court in fact did not stay out of
the dispute. In reality, it decided that the old charter government was
the lawful government of Rhode Island. It did so by accepting the deci-
sion of the "political" branches on the matter."0 9 As a consequence, Lu-
ther's damage action was dismissed because the defendant's actions were
lawful.
The Court's reasons for accepting the decision of one of the political
branches on this issue are identical to the reasons given for accepting the
President's decision on which is the lawfully recognized government of a
foreign nation. 110 When a court applies the President's decision to recog-
nize a certain government, it is doing nothing different from its normal
function of applying to the dispute the law given by another branch. The
political branches make decisions; the courts interpret and apply them.
It requires no special doctrine to defer to the decisional authority of the
other branches on subjects within their special competence. 1 1
Curiously, however, even in Luther the Court reserved some notion
of legal standards in the Guarantee Clause:1 2 "Unquestionably, a mili-
tary government, established as the permanent government of the State,
would not be a republican government, and it would be the duty of Con-
108. Id. at 42.
109. Whether the people of a state have "changed it or not by abolishing an old govern-
ment, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to be settled by the political power.
And when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its decision, and to
follow it." Id. at 47.
110. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 405-12 (1964); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); L. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 47.
111. Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 608 (1976). To
Professor Redish, the Henkin analysis borrowed here "amounts to little more than a play on
words." Redish, supra note 12, at 1036. But the difference is only that Redish looks to the
manner of the Court's decision, while Henkin and this author look at the results of the Court's
decision. Everything that Redish says about the inappropriateness of the Court's analysis can
certainly be shared by an adherent of the view that the Court actually decided the issues before
it.
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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gress to overthrow it. 1" 3 If the question of what is a republican form of
government was truly nonjusticiable, from what did the Court derive the
authority for this titillating bit of dictum? Further, if Congress has a
"duty" to act, by what means is that duty to be enforced? Unless the
Court is willing to enjoin congressional action, the answer must be that
the duty is enforceable only through political persuasion. The duty is not
a judicially enforceable duty and therefore not a "legal" duty by the nor-
mal meaning of our language.
Coleman v. Miller114 could be described as a "political question"
case or as a straightforward decision on the merits. When Kansas at-
tempted to ratify the Child Labor Amendment many years after it was
promulgated, the plaintiffs challenged the attempt on the ground that the
Constitution permitted a proposed amendment to lie before the states for
only a "reasonable" period of time. The Court rejected the argument
that an open-ended ratification period would result in a potential failure
of consensus among the states at any one time. In dictum, the Court
stated that Congress could set an expiration date if it chose, but the pres-
ence of that option did not affect the conclusion that the Court could not
set a limit.'" 5 Coleman is nothing other than a decision that the Consti-
tution alone does not impose an expiration date. No special doctrine is
implicated in that constitutional interpretation.
2. Baker v. Carr and the Criteria of Political Questions
By the time Baker v. CarrI6 reached the Supreme Court, along with
several other challenges to the apportionment of mostly Southern and
Midwestern legislatures, the Court had been saying in dictum and
nonmajority opinions for sixteen years that malapportionment was bad
but had been waiting for the legislatures to cure the problem them-
selves.1 7 The initial problem faced by the Court in Baker v. Carr was
113. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.
114. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
115. Id. at 451-54.
116. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
117. Most of the early cases challenging state legislative malapportionment did so on the
grounds that it denied a republican form of government or that it diluted voting rights. Most
state legislatures were modeled after the bicameral approach of the United States Congress, in
which one house is designed to represent roughly equal blocs of people and the other house is
designed to represent historic political units. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, popu-
lation shifts began to have a dramatic impact on the social and political scene as families
tended to congregate in cities. These rapid shifts in population were not followed in many
states by redesign of voting districts. The urban districts contained many more people than the
rural districts on as much as a 20:1 ratio. Imagine, for example, a Georgia Legislature in
which Atlanta had one seat out of twenty-four even though more than half the people in the
state lived in Atlanta. The result would be that rural interests would dominate the legislature
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Justice Frankfurter's language in Colegrove118 describing legislative ap-
portionment as a "political thicket" into which the courts should not
venture.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Baker Court identified six indicia
of a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question.119
The first two elements invoke the nature of the judicial function, while
the last four refer in various ways to compelling needs for deference to
the other branches of government. Justice Brennan's categories are use-
ful for comparing other cases.
a. Commitment to Another Branch
The first indicator of a political question described by Justice Bren-
nan is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department." Professor Wechsler articulates
what has come to be known as the "classical" form of the political ques-
and make it impossible for the bulk of the people to have their way in a democratic process.
Once a system of this type was in place, it would be impossible for the legislature to reappor-
tion itself because the legislators would have no incentive to district themselves out of a seat.
Challenges to this type of situation began arriving in the Supreme Court immediately after
World War II. In Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1945), the Supreme Court could muster
only a 3-1-3 vote with Justice Frankfurter announcing the result and authoring the plurality
opinion. In that opinion, he described legislative apportionment as a "political thicket" into
which courts should not venture. Id. at 556. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948), took
tentative steps toward viewing the problem as a denial of equal protection, stating in dictum
that a state could not permit unequal representation in its legislature. South v. Peters, 339 U.S.
276 (1950), dismissed a reapportionment request on the now outdated notion that a court of
equity will not order affirmative steps to be taken by a defendant. Then, in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court was faced with a ludicrous example of racial dis-
crimination when a town redrew its own boundaries into a 28-sided figure to exclude black
residents from voting in city elections; this action was declared to be a denial of equal protec-
tion and attention was focused on dealing with state legislatures. For further background, see
Pollak, Judicial Power and the Politics of the People, 72 YALE L.J. 81 (1962).
118. 328 U.S. at 556.
119. 369 U.S. at 217.
tion doctrine by asserting that this is the only acceptable use of the
doctrine:
[A]ll the doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are called
upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another
agency of government the autonomous determination of the issue
raised, a finding that itself requires an interpretation.... That...
is toto caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain or
intervene. 1 2
0
Under this view of the doctrine, the Court would actually decide the
constitutional issue by deciding that the other branch of government had
acted within its power under the Constitution. 2'
In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan had no difficulty with this ques-
tion because the Tennessee Legislature was not a coordinate body but a
subordinate body. For Professor Wechsler, however, the Court should
have deferred to the powers of Congress with regard to election regula-
tions and the Guarantee Clause. In his view, courts were excluded from
"passing on a constitutional objection to state gerrymanders" because
that job was for Congress. 122
This elaboration of the Wechsler position unfortunately obscures the
clarity of his view that political question reasoning is just constitutional
interpretation. As in Richardson and Coleman, the presence of a poten-
tial congressional remedy is extraneous to the question of a judicial rem-
edy.123 That some third party, in this instance Congress, could invalidate
the scheme is almost irrelevant to the question before the Court of the
constitutional rights and duties of the Tennessee Legislature and voters.
It is equally irrelevant that Congress would be acting under constitu-
tional mandates so long as those mandates are different from the ones
urged on the Court. What the Wechsler position does not do is permit
the Court to "refuse decision" on a provision that can be enforced later
by Congress.
The Court's role in deciding whether an issue is committed to an-
120. Wechsler, supra note 9, at 7-9.
121. Id. at 8-9.
122. Id. at 9.
123. This view was consistent with Professor Wechsler's desire to depoliticize the Court,
guarding its judicial review power from political attack by using the power only when neutral
principles were required. Professor Weschler's reliance on Chief Justice Marshall's statement
in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), that a "Court has no more power to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not", was
designed to counter what he viewed to be the very dangerous suggestion that a court has
discretion and a choice about whether to become involved in a volatile political dispute. The
neutral principles that he advocated would often leave the court out of the dispute but give it
greater legitimacy when it was forced to intervene.
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other branch is well illustrated by Powell v. McCormack.24 Adam Clay-
ton Powell was reelected to Congress while under heavy suspicion of
wrongdoing. The House of Representatives refused to seat him on the
grounds of improprieties committed as a Congressman. Although article
one, section five of the Constitution provides that "[e]ach House shall be
the Judge of the Qualifications of its own Members," the Court rejected
the argument that this constituted a textual commitment of "judicially
unreviewable power to set qualifications for membership and to judge
whether prospective members meet those qualifications." '125 The "quali-
fications," of which each House is to be the sole judge, are those listed in
article one, section two-age, citizenship, and residence.
Professor Dixon made the Frankfurter-Bickel argument that the
Court should have stayed out of the Powell dispute simply because it was
politically volatile. "The proper formulation [of the political question
doctrine] is: Even if there be no 'textually demonstrable' (or historically
verifiable) commitment, should the judiciary proceed to exercise the juris-
diction it concededly possesses?" '126 In response, Professor Laughlin
pointed out that the Court could not have avoided the dispute in any
event. "A decision that the Powell case posed a 'political question' would
have been a victory for the respondents of equal or greater magnitude
than a decision that Powell was properly excluded under Article I, Sec-
tion 5, for it would have conceded that Congress has unfettered power to
exclude members-elect for whatever reason it chooses."' 27  Surely
Laughlin has the better of the arguments, at least in describing the results
if not the techniques of adjudication.
b. Standards To Be Applied-Is There Law?
The "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving" a question is listed by Justice Brennan in Baker as the second
of the six indicia of a political question. 2 The "standards" applying to
the apportionment of legislatures were said by Justice Brennan to be fa-
miliar questions of discrimination.'29 But Baker left some important
questions to be resolved in future litigation, including whether areas with
greater natural resources or more dispersed populations were entitled to
more votes per person than populated areas; whether historical bounda-
ries (such as county lines) were entitled to weight in the apportionment
124. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
125. Id. at 548.
126. Dixon, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. Rrv. 1, 111 (1969).
127. Id. at 103.
128. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
129. Id. at 209-10.
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process; and whether one house of a two-house legislature could reflect
unequal population, as the United States Senate does, for an an-
tidemocratic checking function.130 Ultimately, the choice among any of
the infinite methods of drawing voting district lines is at best a nontradi-
tional judicial function.
After several intermediate steps, the Court squarely faced its self-
created dilemma in Reynolds v. Sims. 3 ' The Court decided that "legisla-
tors represent people, not trees, ' 132 a conclusion that is not altogether
obvious from the Constitution. The Court adopted as its standard of
review and relief the view that each person's vote in a state legislative
election should count the same as every other person's vote. The Court
thus instituted the one person, one vote principle. 133 Over time, however,
application of this principle has yielded to pressures of slight variations
from district to district, reflection of historic local boundaries, or difficul-
ties of administration. The Court now seems willing to accept up to a ten
percent variance among district populations if there is a nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the variance.'
If the Court had thought ahead at the time of Baker to the question
of what standards it would be using after Reynolds, it would have been
able to deal with the "political" argument more cleanly. If Reynolds and
its progeny had been decided differently, Baker might have been nonjus-
ticiable. For example, if there were no standards and the choice of draw-
ing district lines was one of choosing from among infinite numbers of
equally valid proposals, the task is no more a judicial task than determin-
ing the appropriate level of taxation or the appropriate level of rates for a
public utility. Those are the nonjusticiable issues, the ones that cal for
judgment based on no standards other than political desirability or
expediency.
When the Court decided in Baker that there were standards avail-
able for judging the legality of particular districting schemes, it should
have known what those standards were. This was as much a decision on
the merits as would have been a decision that the issues were nonjusticia-
ble because they called for purely political judgments. Conversely, to
have dismissed the case on the basis of a lack of standards would have
been a victory on the merits for the sitting legislature.
130. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-81 (1964).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 562.
133. Id. at 562-68.
134. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763-64 (1973).
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c. Inter-Branch Disputes
Perhaps the most difficult political question cases involve a blend of
Justice Brennan's last four indicia. These are the cases of inter-branch
disputes based on separation of powers. One of the principal areas for
advocacy of the political question doctrine has been in the field of foreign
affairs or international relations. 135 These cases are particularly difficult
for the Court when, as is often the case, one branch has exercised author-
ity and the other branch has been silent or has acquiesced, as in recent
uses of military force by the Executive. 136 Despite Congress' silence or
acquiescence, the executive action may be challenged as a violation of
Congress' power in the field. When these cases arise, they often seem to
be almost unripe or noncontroversies because the "offended" branch has
not taken steps to assert its prerogatives. But when the challenged action
directly harms an individual citizen, the focus should shift from the "of-
fended" to the "offending" branch.
Perhaps the most illustrative case is Goldwater v. Carter.13 7 Presi-
dent Carter purported to abrogate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan
and several Senators sued to enjoin his unilateral action. The Court was
not able to reach a consensus position, although a majority did agree that
no relief should be granted. The Rehnquist plurality of four Justices ex-
plicitly based its decision on the political question doctrine. For this
group, the question "must surely be controlled by political standards."
1 38
The most important factors seemed to be the possibility of using different
termination procedures for different treaties, and the "resources available
[to Congress] to protect and assert its interests."' 3 9 Justice Powell argued
that this was a case that was not ripe because the Senate had not asserted
its interests as a corporate body.14°
The effect of both the Rehnquist and Powell positions is to uphold
the actions of the President until such time as Congress objects and
claims that a different procedure is required by law. The next question is
what would happen if the Senate had attempted to exert its authority? In
Goldwater, the Senate had considered and failed to pass a resolution dis-
agreeing with the President's action. If that resolution were passed, then
135. Henkin canvasses the arguments prior to Vietnam thoroughly in L. HENKIN, supra
note 10, ch. VII.
136. See generally Note, The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1407
(1984).
137. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
138. Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291,
1302 (N.D. Ill. 1975)).
139. Id. at 1004.
140. Id. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the Court would be presented with an inter-branch dispute calling for
decision on a new set of facts. Now the Court would be ruling on the
efficacy of the Senate's action rather than the President's action. Both
the Rehnquist and Powell positions effectively rule on the President's
ability to act unilaterally while explicitly holding open the question of
what would happen if the Senate disapproved. 141
3. The Vietnam War Cases and the Criteria of Political Questions
Many cases brought during the Vietnam War challenged the author-
ity of the President to conduct a war without congressional declaration
of war or in violation of various treaty obligations.142 The lower courts
dismissed these cases, usually on the basis of the political question doc-
trine, and the Supreme Court steadfastly denied certiorari. 43
If the dismissals were premised on a constitutional commitment of
the question to the President, then in essence the courts held that the
President's conduct of the war was within his constitutional powers-a
decision on the merits. On the other hand, if the question of the validity
of executive authority was committed for primary consideration by Con-
gress, then the dismissals appear to be based on a lack of ripeness. The
courts would be saying that what the President has done is acceptable
until Congress says otherwise. What would happen if Congress ordered
the President to cease hostilities and he refused? At that point the issue of
the President's compliance with the law of Congress would be squarely
presented and unavoidable. This, however, would not be a holding with
respect to the constitutional powers of the President because that issue
had already been decided in the case by deferring to Congress, and the
141. A similar analysis presents itself with respect to the War Powers Resolution, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982), repassed over the veto of President Nixon in 1973. The Act re-
quires the President to report military excursions to Congress and to withdraw forces sixty
days later unless Congress passes an authorizing resolution. A suit challenging an initial foray
would probably be met with the contention that Congress is implicitly acquiescing unless it
passes a disapproving resolution. On the sixty-first day, the same result would still prevail. If
Congress did finally pass a disapproving resolution, then the Court would have a nonconstitu-
tional basis of decision. At that point, of course, it would need to pass on the ability of
Congress under the Constitution to order the President to withdraw the forces. But the critical
question on the constitutional authority of the President to act in the absence of congressional
action would have been answered back when the Court deferred to congressional action. See
Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Note,
supra note 136.
142. See, e.g., McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968); Holmes v. United States, 391
U.S. 936 (1968); Schwartz & McCormack, The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the Ameri-
can Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEx. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
143. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973); Velvel v. Nixon, 396 U.S. 1042
(1970); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
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current case would require only a statutory decision.'" Thus, even the
decision to defer initially to Congress would be a final decision that the
President may continue to act so far as the Constitution is concerned.
In Orlando v. Laird,'4  the Second Circuit held that the executive
use of force in Vietnam constituted a justiciable question at the behest of
an enlistee seeking an injunction against being sent to Vietnam. The
standard on the constitutional issue was held to be the extent of legisla-
tive involvement in authorizing or acquiescing in the executive action.146
After reviewing the legislative record, the court found that appropria-
tions, the draft, and various congressional resolutions were sufficient to
meet the test.147 By contrast, in Mitchell v. Laird,14 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held the issues to be nonjusticiable, citing difficulties in
obtaining facts and the necessity of deferring to the discretion of the
President in foreign affairs. It is difficult to construe the holding in
Mitchell as anything other than a ruling that the President has unfettered
discretion, so far as the judiciary is concerned, to do as he or she wishes
in making war. 49 Although the court professed to leave open the ques-
144. Of course, the resolution of Congress might then be subjected to scrutiny under INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See Note, supra note 136, at 1433.
145. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
146. Id. at 1043.
147. In DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1971), the
court reread Orlando as a political question holding, and then held that repeal of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution did not change anything.
The same court also dealt with a number of late challenges to bombing and mining of
harbors. In DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973), the court held that it could not
review the mining of harbors or bombing in North Vietnam because it was up to Congress to
determine whether those were unauthorized acts and to express its will accordingly. The court
hinted that an unauthorized creation of new war conditions might be reviewable. Id. at 1156.
In Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974),
plaintiffs challenged the bombing of Cambodia in the face of congressional resolutions calling
for deescalation. Congress enacted an August 15, 1973 cutoff date for the bombing to end and
President Nixon acceded to that limit. Thus the court reached the issue of whether bombing
constituted a usurpation of congressional authority even though the case would be moot within
one week after it was argued. Judicial review could not include, in the court's view, the tacti-
cal decisions of the Executive. Whether the Executive had made a "change in the character of
the war's operations" within the strategic purview of Congress was said to be political rather
than judicial. Id. at 1310. Congress' ability to determine the facts and express itself strategi-
cally was held by the court to alleviate the need for judicial review.
148. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
149. [A] court would not substitute its judgment for that of the President, who has an
unusually wide measure of discretion in this area, and who should not be judicially
condemned except in a case of clear abuse amounting to bad faith. Otherwise, a
court would be ignoring the delicacies of diplomatic negotiation, the inevitable bar-
gaining for the best solution of an international conflict, and the scope which in for-
eign affairs must be allowed to the President if this country is to play a responsible
role in the council of the nations.
Id. at 616.
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tion of what would happen if the President abused that discretion in bad
faith, it is hard to see how the court would ever make such a ruling in
light of the breadth of its holding in this case. Mitchell must be as much
a decision on the merits as Orlando, but without the explanation that
Orlando provides.
Professor Henkin agrees that the Supreme Court never has and
could not possibly avoid decision on a foreign affairs issue. 5' Some com-
mentators disagree with Professor Henkin and contend that there is a
special rule of judicial abstention appropriate for foreign affairs cases. I5I
Professor Redish maintains that Professor Henkin is entirely too soft on
the doctrine, which in his view exists and should be repudiated. 152 The
differences among the three positions, ultimately, are semantic. But se-
mantics are what the law is about. Law is expressed in words that stand
as symbols for concepts. The concept that makes the most sense in the
foreign affairs area is that a court's decision should resolve the dispute
150. The doctrine of political questions is constitutionally significant only as an ordi-
nance of extraordinary judicial abstention, particularly if it prevents judicial review
of a claim that the federal political branches have failed to live up to constitutional
requirements or limitations. In such a case the courts would say, in effect: "It may
be that, as the petitioner claims, the political branches have indeed violated the Con-
stitution, but in this instance their action raises a question not given to us to review;
only political remedies are available."
Despite common impressions and numerous citations, there are in fact few
cases, and apparently no foreign affairs cases, in which the Supreme Court ordained
or approved such judicial abstention from constitutional review or from deciding
some other question that might have led to a different result in the case. In the
foreign affairs cases commonly cited the courts did not refrain from judging political
actions by constitutional standards; they judged them but found them constitution-
ally not wanting. If the Court sometimes spoke of the special quality of foreign rela-
tions and the need for the nation to speak with one voice, it did so not to support
judicial abstention but to explain the broad constitutional powers granted the Presi-
dent or Congress. In no case did the Court have to use the phrase "political ques-
tions," and when it did, it was using it in a different sense, saying in effect: "We have
reviewed your claim and we find that the action complained of involves a political
question, one that is within the powers granted by the Constitution to the political
branches to decide. The act complained of violates no constitutional limitations on
that power, either because the Constitution imposes no relevant limitations, or be-
cause the action is amply within the limits prescribed. We give effect to what the
political branches have done because they had political authority under the Consti-
tution to do it."
L. HENKIN, supra note 10, at 213-14 (footnotes omitted). See also, Henkin, supra note I1l.
151. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 (1985).
152. Though respected scholars have for years debated the scope and wisdom of the
political question doctrine, none to date has fully explained why the doctrine should
be given the total and complete repudiation it so richly deserves. Ultimately, neither
Wechsler's "classical" form of the doctrine nor Bickel's "prudential" version is
valid-the "classical" form because, at least as applied by the Court and commenta-
tors, it represents a fundamentally flawed view of the concept of judicial review, and
the "prudential" form because, quite simply, its moral, social, and political costs
outweigh its speculative benefits.
Redish, supra note 12, at 1033 (footnotes omitted).
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first before attempting to establish law in the form of judicial precedent.
Redish's position differs from Henkin's by focusing on the basis of the
court's decision rather than on the outcome. As Redish states, the doc-
trine should be repudiated in favor of judicial review when a case is
before the court. As Henkin asserts, however, it should also be recog-
nized that the effect of adjudication is the same regardless of how the
court labels its result.
II. The Rationales and Significance of Justiciability
All of the foregoing has been premised on two propositions. First, it
assumes that the Court has accepted jurisdiction of a "case" in the sense
of having granted certiorari or noted probable jurisdiction; in the case of
a lower federal court, the jurisdictional question might be more acute.
Second, it implies that there are no "prudential considerations" which
would properly motivate a court to hide its rationale, giving itself maxi-
mum flexibility. It is time now to deal explicitly with these propositions.
A. The Jurisdictional Limitation
Some kinds of proceedings are not judicial in nature. 5 3 Further, it is
conceded that some nonjusticiable issues call for political judgment with-
153. One of the earliest decisions regarding the judicial role was the letter from the
Supreme Court Justices, refusing to answer "extra-judicially" President Washington's ques-
tions regarding the obligations of the United States under various treaties and rules of interna-
tional law. 3 H. JOHNSTON, CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488-89
(1891). The premises of refusal were that the courts should leave themselves free to decide the
same issues if they later arose in litigation and that the Constitution explicitly placed the re-
sponsibility for giving advice to the President in other executive branch officers.
There are, of course, "controversies" that would require the court to perform a nonjudi-
cial role, such as answering questions outside the format of a judicial proceeding, or attempting
to have a court set rates for public utilities. These problems, however, are easily distinguished
by the structure of the proceeding itself. A judicial proceeding is characterized by two con-
nected elements: (1) the presentation of questions in a "Yes-No" format; and (2) the presence
of articulable standards for decision. In ajudicial proceeding, either the plaintiff or the defend-
ant is right on the law; one side must win what another loses in a "zero-sum" game. The
reasons for insisting on a "judicial" structure are many and familiar. They include the lack of
staff and other resources for selecting among an infinite range of solutions for social problems,
the lack of taxing authority for funding new solutions, the unelected source of the judiciary's
authority, and the character of the standards to be applied by the judiciary.
Even though some of these concerns have spilled over into the justifications for other
nominal forms of "justiciability," we need not pause long on this branch of the doctrine. In its
classic form, justiciability has presented few significant difficulties in application. Compare
Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923) (Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to
review acts within legislative discretion of public utility commission) with United States v.
First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361 (1967) (permitting judicial review of bank
mergers approved by the Comptroller of the Currency).
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out judicial standards to guide a decision.154 In both those instances, a
court would not accept jurisdiction.
Those cases are the very paradigm of how the courts should decide a
constitutional right is absent. If someone brings a lawsuit to challenge
the level of her taxes because she thinks they are too high, she loses on
the merits of the constitutional issue because she has no constitutional
right to lower taxes. No matter how much she might scream that the
current level is confiscatory, she loses unless she can point to a constitu-
tional provision such as the First Amendment that is violated by the gov-
ernment's use of the money. She loses because her view of the law was
wrong, not because she never got into court.
On the other hand, there are some dismissals that are truly jurisdic-
tional in nature. In the case of Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,'5" the
Court dismissed a challenge to municipal ordinances regulating charita-
ble solicitations because the ordinances were so intertwined with other
provisions not before the Court and so vaguely interpreted by the state
courts that the Court could not make sense of the merits of the case.
Although the dismissal was phrased in terms of a discretionary refusal to
exercise jurisdiction, there was no case on which the Court could rule.
The dismissal was truly jurisdictional in the sense that the same parties
could bring the same case back to the Court after clarification, free of any
issue or claim preclusion.
B. The Separation of Powers Rationale
A number of recent writings have described the standing doctrine as
a question of separation of powers. 56 Judge, now Justice, Antonin Scalia
states that "the judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable
element of [the separation of powers] principle, whose disegard will inev-
itably produce-as it has in the past few decades-an overijudicialization
of the processes of self-governance." '57
154. See supra notes 128-134.
155. 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
156. This is merely a play on words if the question is whether constitutional prohibitions
should be adjudicated more readily when a statute is challenged than when administrative
action is challenged. In the case of a challenge to administrative action, the first question is
whether the action is within the legislated authority of the agency. Asking this question first
recognizes separation of powers in the sense that it is up to the Legislature to describe the
limits of the agency discretion. If the court moves to constitutionality, however, separation of
powers no longer has anything to do with the issue.
157. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881 (1983). Justice Scalia goes on to point out that wrapping the
question of whether a plaintiff has suffered injury to a "legal right" in "prudential" standing
language makes it seem as if the Court itself is deciding not to adjudicate, rather than making
it clear that the Legislature has decided that the claimed right does not exist. Id. at 886.
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In Allen v. Wright,158 the Court specifically invoked separation of
powers as the reason for denying standing to challenge IRS practices
with regard to tax exemptions for segregated schools. The Court stated
in a footnote that "we rely on separation of powers principles to interpret
the 'fairly traceable' component of the standing requirement."' 59 The
Court seems to be saying that it is solely an executive function to deter-
mine whether the Executive has caused harm to a citizen, a rather ludi-
crous result. The Court also states that it is an executive, not a judicial
function, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 160 The
requirement of faithful execution itself could be a vehicle for judicial re-
view if the Court were willing to enforce the duty of faithful execution. 6'
Allen has nothing to do with separation of powers but instead with
whether there is a judicially enforceable duty on the part of the Executive
to enforce the laws. When the Court decides that there is not, then the
plaintiff is held to have no right to judicial enforcement.
Another reading of the Court's insistence that standing is built on
separation of powers, is that judicial review is an appropriate judicial
function only when the Court is forced to exercise it because government
itself has initiated the judicial process. This limited view of judicial re-
view actually could be squared with the opinion in Marbury by focusing
on Justice Marshall's reading of the necessity of a court's choosing the
law to apply in a given case. 62 Under this view, the law of justiciability
becomes a part of the law of remedies; the Constitution could be read in
many instances not to create an affirmative right to relief but only a
shield against government action. 16 3 The proponents of a separation of
powers rationale, however, purport to go much further.
Justice Scalia observes that many of the Burger Court standing cases
involve allegations that the government is acting against the interests of a
majority of the people or is ignoring legislative mandates. Justice Scalia
elaborates the separation of powers theme in the following way:
[W]hat is wrong with having [judges] protect the rights of the ma-
jority as well? ... The answer is that there is no reason to believe
they will be any good at it. In fact, they have in a way been specifi-
cally designed to be bad at it-selected from the aristocracy of the
158. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
159. Id. at 761 n.26.
160. Id. at 761 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
161. This, however, usually is not an enforceable duty. See supra notes 51-62 and accom-
panying text.
162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
163. Cf Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 864 (1986);




highly educated, instructed to be governed by a body of knowledge
that values abstract principle above concrete result, and (just in
case any connection with the man in the street might subsist) re-
moved from all accountability to the electorate. That is just per-
fect for a body that is supposed to protect the individual against
the people; it is just terrible (unless you are a monarchist) for a
group that is supposed to decide what is good for the people.... It
may well be, of course, that the judges know what is good for the
people better than the people themselves; or that democracy simply
does not permit the genuine desires of the people to be given effect;
but those are not the premises under which our system operates.
16
Justice Scalia's assumption that a court is "supposed to decide what
is good for the people" highlights the very sort of thinking that leads to
the justiciability myth in the first place. That is exactly what a court is
not supposed to decide; that is the nonjusticiable issue. What the court is
supposed to decide is whether the people's representatives have trans-
gressed the limits set in the organic document. It is when judges start
thinking that they are supposed to decide what is good for the people
that they violate separation of powers and then feel the need for some
protection from having to make that decision in some instances. There is
no need for the myth if the judge's role is carefully observed. 165
The Scalia version of separation of powers is simply one more state-
ment of the antimajoritarian objection to judicial review itself. What he
seems to advocate is that the majority can change the organic law, a
notion fundamentally at odds with the nature of a written constitu-
tion.166 The majority may be able to waive their "rights" but it is diffi-
164. Scalia, supra note 157, at 896-97 (emphasis in original).
165. The only sense in which standing can rationally implicate principles of separation of
powers is in statutory interpretation. When the court decides that a party does not have
"standing" to make a claim under a federal statute, it says only that Congress did not pass a
law protecting that person. This is an exercise in separation of powers only in the sense that
Congress has made the law for the court to interpret and enforce. It is certainly not an exer-
cise in justiciability or any other special doctrine. Another way of looking at the separation of
powers issue is to ask who can change the result if the Court is wrong about a case. If the
Court decided that an administrative decision either was within both statutory and constitu-
tional authority or exceeded statutory authority, an unhappy Congress could change the result
by changing the statute. If the Court decided that either a legislative enactment or an adminis-
trative decision was in violation of the Constitution, Congress would not be free to change the
result without submitting the issue to the people for ratification of a constitutional amendment.
These factors argue in favor of the Court's being more explicit about the basis of its decision
when reviewing administrative action. A decision on the basis of standing, as Justice Scalia
would advocate, leaves Congress little on which to act because the Court has not identified the
basis of its holding. The practical effect is to uphold the administrative decision, but Congress
would be able to change the result only by the initial increment of authorizing standing to sue.
166, Doernberg, supra note 6, at 96. There is a very different proposition that would allow
representatives to make a decision free of equal protection constraints when they provide une-
qual benefits to a minority. This view does not postulate that the majority can change the rules
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cult to see how they can waive the rights of the minority just by affecting
them in the same way.
C. The Concreteness and Representational Issues
Professors Brilmayer and Tushnet have engaged in a debate over the
utility of allowing a plaintiff who has no "stake" in the litigation to chal-
lenge a statute or practice. Brilmayer contends that people without a
sufficient stake in the litigation might not present the issues with serious-
ness of purpose or could bind other litigants unfairly.16 7 Tushnet argues
that the ideological plaintiff may bring tremendous resources to bear on a
problem and will often do a better job than someone who accidentally
gets caught up in the litigation process. 168 Professor Tushnet should
have the better of the argument, in that the "public interest" litigant
often will have the resources to make the better arguments and clarify
the issues more cleanly than the poor person accidentally caught up in
litigation.
But what these arguments really prove is that the question is irrele-
vant. The real debate is over whether the court used the proper factors in
determining that this person had no constitutional right. The language
of standing does nothing but mask those considerations.
D. The Husbanding of Judicial Credibility
One argument that is often made with justiciability issues is that the
Court must husband its resources and credibility. In the words of the
second Justice Harlan, the "powers of the federal judiciary will be ade-
quate for the great burdens placed upon them only if they are employed
prudently, with recognition of the strengths as well as the hazards that
go with our kind of representative government." '169 Justice Frankfurter
argued that intervention into political controversies could "impair the
Court's position" through loss of "its moral sanction."170
of the game but that the rules contemplate an apportionment of unequal benefits to the minor-
ity against the interests of the majority. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimina-
tion, 41 U. Cmi. L. REV. 723 (1974); McCormack, Race and Politics in the Supreme Court:
Bakke to Basics, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 491.
167. Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 306-10.
168. Tushnet, The Sociology ofArticle III. A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1698, 1717-21 (1980).
169. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 131 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
170. [Judicial intervention] may well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ
of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly
entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce. The Court's au-
thority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained
public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the
Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entangle-
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Even Justice Brennan could be cited as supporting this point of
view. The last four of his Baker v. Carr indicia refer in one fashion or
another to extreme cases for deference to another branch of government.
The avoidance of "multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question," avoiding a "lack of the respect due coordinate
branches," and an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a polit-
ical decision" 7 ' probably were intended as explanations of why the Con-
stitution should be interpreted to give finality to certain decisions of
other branches, such as whether a particular foreign government should
be recognized as legitimate by the United States, but they sound ex-
tremely amorphous and discretionary.
There can be no more formidable an array of authority than aligning
these Justices on the same side of an issue, but their authority does not
make the position any more tenable. To accept that position is to assert
that courts should use their authority only when it does not matter very
much. If the Court becomes timorous when faced with a monumental
challenge, then its moral force is less in the run-of-the-mill case and most
of our constitutional rhetoric about the bulwarks of liberty is
meaningless.
Perhaps it is fortunate that neither side of this argument can be
demonstrated empirically. That demonstration could only occur if the
Court's authority in fact were lost, at which point the argument would
not be worth winning. Suffice it to say that the timorous position has
never gained dominance nor even, so far as can be determined, a majority
of the Court.
E. The Biding Time Argument
Closely related is the notion that the Court can gain credibility on a
problem by accepting certiorari to attract the attention of the political
branches, dismissing a few cases on justiciability grounds to exert pres-
sure on those branches, and finally deciding the issue if those branches do
not resolve it. One argument against the biding time position is, of
course, that it does not exist; the Court must overrule its prior holdings
to reach a new one. Another argument looks at the impact on those
individuals who are forced to forego constitutional rights in the
meantime. It is tempting to contend that these costs are outweighed by
the value to the system in having the political processes put their houses
ments and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in polit-
ical settlements.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
171. 369 U.S. at 217.
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in order themselves, the self-education argument, but ultimately that ar-
gument fares no better than the husbanding of credibility argument. All
depend on a highly speculative assertion about the good of the system.
Weighed against demonstrable constitutional claims, the speculative na-
ture of that claim takes on diminishing significance.
F. Enforceability of ludicial Decrees
An argument that is sometimes made in informal discourse but
rarely finds its way into judicial opinions or scholarly writings is that the
courts should stay away from controversies in which there is a fear that a
decision might be ignored by one party. The Court faced this problem in
Cooper v. Aaron,172 in which the Court responded vigorously to resist-
ance to judicial school desegregation orders. President Eisenhower used
federal marshals and the national guard where necessary to enforce those
decrees. Enforcement of court decrees has always depended on the will-
ingness of the Executive or ultimately the people to accept the judicial
mandate. Thus the argument on enforceability in the final analysis is the
same as the argument on judicial credibility.
Indeed, the Court's greatest losses of credibility have occurred when
its decrees have been obeyed, as in Dred Scott 173 and during the New
Deal era. At least in the long run, the Court lost more credibility in
giving up in Ex parte McCardle 174 than it did when President Lincoln
refused to obey the writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Taney
in Ex parte Merryman.175
The most serious recent challenge to the enforceability of the
Court's mandate was presented in United States v. Nixon.176 When the
Watergate Special Prosecutor sought the Nixon White House tapes for
use against indicted co-conspirators, the President claimed that executive
privilege protected the tapes from disclosure, and did not promise to
obey any court mandate that they be produced. 177 The Supreme Court
172. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
173. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). It has been said that a "ques-
tion which involved a Civil War can hardly be proper material for the wrangling of lawyers."
A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 185 (quoting Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limita-
tion, 39 HARV. L. REv. 221, 243 (1925)). The implication of that comment seems to be that
the Court should not have heard the case, which might have been possible if the concept of
certiorari had existed at the time. But once the Court had jurisdiction over the case, it could
not avoid the controversy. Dred Scott damaged the credibility of the Court not because it
decided the case, but because it decided the case so badly.
174. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
175. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C. Ct. Md. 1861).
176. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
177. In the face of recent, repeated reassertions by the Supreme Court of the exclu-
siveness ofjudicial power to expound the Constitution, how could a lawyer of James
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did not even hesitate, to consider the enforceability of its decree, before
rendering a unanimous decision that the tapes must be handed over. The
President complied.
If a court begins to worry about the enforceability of its decrees,
then it has already lost the foundations of legitimacy on which the judi-
cial process rests in its entirety. The greatest protection of the Court's
credibility and thus its authoritative force, lies in the inevitability of its
role. If the Court claims a self-protective discretion to refuse decision,
then it must accept the* consequences of public rejection when it does
decide a case that the Executive or the people do not want to enforce.
The appearance of discretion would mean that the Court is only one
voice with no greater claim to legitimacy than any other.
Conclusion
The biggest problem with the justiciability doctrine is that it is dis-
honest. In every instance of its use, the Court in fact decides some impor-
tant constitutional issue but pretends that it "has not heard the case."
Thus the litigants and their supporters are diverted from the central
theme of their challenge.
At one level, the Court actually decides the basic underlying issue
presented by the litigants. The clearest examples of this type of decision
are (1) Valley Forge,78 in which the Court virtually overruled Flast 79
to decide that the Establishment Clause does not prevent gifts of prop-
erty to religious schools; (2) Allen, 8 ' in which the Court held that gov-
ernment is not required to deny tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
schools; and (3) Warth, 8 1 in which the Court held that residents do not
have a right to have low income or minority coresidents. In these cases,
the Court's dishonesty is troubling in itself. It is also troubling in that it
D. St. Clair's ability seriously contend in oral argument before the Supreme Court on
behalf of President Nixon that "This matter is being submitted to this court for its
guidance and judgment with respect to the law. The President, on the other hand,
has his obligations under the Constitution."
For this nation, however, this issue presumably has been settled. Somehow or
other, the courts have come into possession of the authority to resolve constitutional
issues with finality. Although the intellectual operation entailed is like that used in
the exercise of "judicial review," the function is altogether distinct. Exercise of the
power of "constitutional review" places the courts in a relation with the other two
branches totally different from that grounding "judicial review."
Strong, President, Congress, Judiciary: One Is More Equal Than the Others, 60 A.B.A. J. 1050,
1050-52 (1974) (citation omitted).
178. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
179. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
180. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
181. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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leads to a misunderstanding of basic rules of law because the "rule of
decision" has not been stated and therefore is difficult to apply to the
next case. It is even more difficult to apply in political debates. The
"debate value" of the constitutional provision has been rendered virtually
null.
At another level, the Court may hold that the challenged action was
within the bounds of the challenged actor's authority. The clearest ex-
ample of this phenomenon is Goldwater v. Carter,182 in which the Court
held that the President is free to terminate a treaty at least until Congress
tells him not to do so. In other "political question" cases, the Court
purports to leave open the possibility that a constitutional constraint ex-
ists but that its contours and application are up to another branch, as
when the Court decided that Congress was the sole judge of whether to
impose a deadline on ratification of the Child Labor Amendment.18 3
When the Court holds that it is up to another branch to decide the
meaning of a constitutional term, it has exercised judicial review. For
example, deciding that Congress must determine what is a "republican
form of government" and deciding that Congress may regulate the states
when they affect interstate commerce, are two instances of the same deci-
sionmaking authority. The Court has not refused to decide "the issue";
it has decided the issue by holding that another branch has final
authority. 184
Deciding that a constitutional provision is merely hortatory may be
appropriate in some instances, such as recognizing that Congress is the
final judge of some qualifications of its members or that the Tenth
Amendment is a tautology. When this happens, however, the decision
must be made with conscious attention to the reasons for so deciding and
for the consequences. The result is a decision on an important issue of
constitutional law, not an avoidance of anything.'85
182. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). See supra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
183. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
184. To Professor Redish, this amounts to "a play on words." It may be, but it is impor-
tant to identify the word play so that the Court's game can be called. Redish, supra note 12, at
1036.
185. The final question is whether a hortatory provision might nevertheless be part of the
law of the Constitution. At least with regard to constitutional constraints, law must exist apart
from the enforcers, because there can be no such thing as unenforceable law. To this degree,
we are all positivists if we want the political branches to be constrained by something external
to themselves. Otherwise, the game is given completely to the politicians, who have become
judges with no external constraints, at which point constitutional law would become nonlaw.
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